An Urban's Rural View

The critics of President Barack Obama's move to normalize relations with Cuba are right about one thing: The Castro regime made no concessions on human rights in return for the softened U.S. stance.

The U.S. agreed to an exchange of ambassadors and the lifting of strictures on investment and travel. What we got in return was a prisoner exchange. The dictatorship made not even a ritual bow towards greater economic and political freedom for the Cuban people.

But does that make the normalization a mistake? The critics' case for thinking so is based on wishful thinking.

Instead of admitting that what we've been doing for five-plus decades hasn't worked, the critics insist we're on the verge of success. We just need to do it awhile longer, they say, because plunging oil prices will soon force Venezuela to stop subsidizing Cuba, which will undermine the Cuban economy, threatening the regime's legitimacy and forcing the dictators to grant more economic and political freedoms.

Except.

Except.

Except.

Except it's possible Venezuela won't cut Cuba off. Or if it does it's possible Cuba will find another benefactor, as it did when Russia cut Cuba off a couple decades ago. Even if the Cuban economy collapses the result might not be a freer people. If anything a threatened regime might crack down even harder.

No one denies the repression of the Cuban people is a terrible thing. The question is whether it's a terrible thing the U.S. can do anything about -- and if so what.

Note, please, that with other repressive regimes, like China and Vietnam, we don't even try. We criticize their violations of human rights but we don't let those violations interfere with trade, investment, travel or diplomatic relations. If our guiding principle is to have normal relations only with liberal of liberalizing regimes, why apply it to Cuba alone?

Critics of the normalization say President Obama isn't the cagiest of negotiators. They're probably right, but it's doubtful a tougher negotiator could have won those concessions.

Dictators tend to see repression as the key to power. As much as the Castros want better relations with the U.S., they want to cling to power more. They were never going to cede even a modicum of political control in a negotiation with the U.S.

Nor, contrary to the critics' complaints, did President Obama give away all our negotiating leverage with the Cubans. The embargo continues. If some future Congress is inclined to lift it, you can bet another negotiation with Cuba will take place first.

And if in the interim Cuba is found sponsoring terrorism or otherwise misbehaving, the U.S. will have the option of cutting off diplomatic ties and imposing new sanctions.

History teaches that the more prosperous people become, the more they demand a say in how they're governed. They don't always get that say (think China), but they do sometimes (think Taiwan and South Korea).

Prosperity is many years away for the Cubans and even if it miraculously came today the Castros would mow down protestors in the streets before yielding to demands for democracy. But the Castros won't live forever. And as American tourists descend on Havana, their dollars will at least help relieve Cubans' poverty.

The critics seem to assume that the U.S. has no national interests at stake in its relations with Cuba other than promoting freedom and democracy. Bad assumption. The list of other interests starts with (but is hardly limited to) expanding trade and easing tensions with a country only 90 miles from our shores.

But even granting the critics' assumption for the sake of argument, their argument fails to persuade. Continuing a policy that has failed for 50 years won't advance the cause of human rights in Cuba. Normalizing ties just might.

It's certainly worth a try.

Urban Lehner

urbanity@hotmail.com

(CZ)

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