OSHA Shortfalls Seen in West, Texas

Ammonium Nitrate Storage Still Insecure, Says Chemical Safety Board Report

Todd Neeley
By  Todd Neeley , DTN Staff Reporter
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Some 20 to 30 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated at West Fertilizer as a result of a fire, causing an explosion that killed 15 people and injured more than 200 in the tiny town of West, Texas, south of Dallas. (DTN file photo by Todd Neeley)

OMAHA (DTN) -- The Occupational Safety and Health Administration seemingly did little to secure ammonium nitrate stockpiles across the United States prior to the fatal 2013 disaster at West Fertilizer Company in West, Texas, according to a final report on the disaster released by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board last week.

What's more, even if companies such as West Fertilizer and others that store and sell ammonium nitrate had followed OSHA specifications for storing in bulk, it wouldn't be enough to prevent disasters like what occurred in West, the Chemical Safety Board concluded.

Some 20 to 30 tons of ammonium nitrate detonated at West Fertilizer as a result of a fire, causing an explosion that killed 15 people and injured more than 200 in the tiny town south of Dallas. In all, the explosion caused some $230 million in damage to schools, a nursing home, houses, apartments and city infrastructure.

The CSB concluded that because AN was stored in wooden bins, it increased the fire hazard and ultimately contributed to the detonation -- although the OSHA standard allows storage in wood bins.

What's more, the CSB said many agencies across the country that would have a role in safeguarding ammonium nitrate were found to have little or no knowledge of the OSHA standard.

In the months and years following the tragedy, it was revealed ammonium nitrate was stored in wooden bins at West Fertilizer -- considered by OSHA regulations to be appropriate as long as the wood is treated to prevent the absorption of ammonium nitrate.

The CSB report identified many Texas communities still in danger of explosions similar to West Fertilizer, with ammonium nitrate stockpiles near schools and homes.

Just two months following the explosion in West, a DTN/Progressive Farmer investigation found many AN stockpiles located near schools, residential areas and other population centers: http://tinyurl.com/…

"While CSB found no evidence to suggest that any detonation of AN in the United States has occurred at a facility compliant with OSHA's 1910.109(i) standard, CSB does find that these requirements do not offer sufficient safeguards concerning the bulk storage of (ammonium nitrate)," said the CSB report.

"This conclusion is evidenced best by the WFC incident, in which the use of wooden bins (albeit not untreated wooden bins) to store FGAN (fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate) was allowed under the 1910.109(i) standard. The CSB found that such construction likely facilitated the fire's spread between storage bins."

Further, the CSB said even if the wooden bins had been treated with coated or clad materials, "they are not fire resistant and will still burn."

OSHA ENFORCEMENT LACKING

Even with the federal code in place for storage of ammonium nitrate, the CSB said OSHA did little to enforce the standards on fertilizer companies.

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There have been 19 inspections that resulted in citations, excluding those issued to West Fertilizer, according to the CSB. Ten of the citations were related to non-farm facilities dealing mostly with explosives. The remaining nine inspections were related to farm supply facilities.

"It is important to note, however, that these data reflect citations only, not inspections," CSB said.

"That is, although the facilities ... were inspected against, and cited for violations of, 1910.109(i), they do not represent all inspections conducted by OSHA against that section of the standard. It is impossible to determine whether OSHA inspected any other facilities for compliance, but did not cite them. CSB found no evidence of citations from 1999 to 2013."

A May 2014 Government Accountability Office report said OSHA rarely issued citations for violations of the federal code for AN storage.

After the West Fertilizer tragedy, OSHA issued 24 citations to the company on Oct. 9, 2013, including nine for "serious violations" of the OSHA regulation, the CSB report said. Violations included lack of adequate ventilation, absence of fire-resistive construction and improper storage and bin pile heights. OSHA also cited West Fertilizer for not treating wooden bins.

The Chemical Safety Board said it expressed concern to OSHA on March 31, 2014, about gaps in standards for securing ammonium nitrate.

In the months and years following the West disaster, it was noted by some experts the accident could have been prevented had West Fertilizer been required to install a sprinkler system. The CSB said the OSHA standard requiring sprinklers did not apply to West.

That's because storage of bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate "requires sprinklers only for bagged AN in amounts exceeding 2,500 tons," CSB said in the report.

The Chemical Safety Board said the use of sprinklers at West Fertilizer "likely would have helped minimize the severity of the impact" of the fire and explosion in West.

KNOWLEDGE LACKING

The Chemical Safety Board investigation found employees at West Fertilizer and government agencies tasked with securing ammonium nitrate stockpiles had little knowledge about the OSHA standard.

"During these interviews, CSB learned that OSHA conducted its last inspection of the WFC plant in 1985, when the facility was cited for various violations concerning anhydrous ammonia, respiratory protection, and recordkeeping," CSB said in the report.

"CSB found no evidence that OSHA cited the WFC for violating any requirement of 1910.109(i) before the April 2013 fire and explosion. It is unknown whether OSHA inspected the facility against this section of the standard."

The Chemical Safety Board said it reviewed guidance documents on ammonium nitrate from government and industry sources, "finding that the only pre-WFC incident reference to the OSHA standard was in an EPA Chemical Safety Alert, 'Explosion Hazard from AN,' from December 1997.

"CSB notes as a concern the fact that the fertilizer industry, as recently as 2014, reported that personnel exhibited little recognition of the applicability of 1910.109(i) to (ammonium nitrate)."

The CSB said OSHA issued an investigation and citation guidance to OSHA enforcement personnel in December 2014 on elements of the standard on wood bins. The nine-page guidance document provides compliance guidance describing conditions that would be considered in or out of compliance.

"Some of the requirements listed under the standard, however, do not provide sufficient safeguards to a facility owner storing bulk quantities of (ammonium nitrate)," CSB said.

"CSB determined that the wood-constructed bins likely contaminated the AN, ultimately leading to the detonation by increasing AN energy and sensitivity.... Completely eliminating wood and other combustibles as materials for constructing FGAN bins and storage facilities greatly reduces the possibility of contaminating FGAN during a fire or smoldering event."

The CSB said though OSHA focused more attention on the hazards of ammonium nitrate storage, the agency still is unable to do all it can to secure stockpiles, including stepping up inspections of facilities.

"However, enforcement guidance does not provide the resources needed by OSHA to increase the frequency of inspections, although such guidance may help ensure that 1910.109(i) is applied appropriately when OSHA compliance officers happen to inspect facilities that fall under the rule," CSB said.

"Imposing stricter requirements on AN storage and handling could take several years before enactment into federal regulations."

Read the full Chemical Safety Board report here: http://tinyurl.com/…

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Editor's Note: For more on the explosion at West Fertilizer Company in West, Texas, and its aftermath, visit the DTN/The Progressive Famer In-Depth site at http://www.dtn.com/…

Todd Neeley can be reached at todd.neeley@dtn.com

Follow him on Twitter @ToddNeeleyDTN

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Todd Neeley

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