An Urban's Rural View

The Russian ban on U.S. and European agricultural imports (http://tiny.cc/…) was no surprise. Even a pawnshop crystal ball could have foreseen the Russians' tit-for-tat response to our sanctions on them.

The question now is not whose economy will suffer more -- theirs is far more likely to feel the hurt, both from our sanctions and, ironically, from their own. The question is whether either side's sanctions will lead to a break in the dangerous Ukrainian stalemate.

Sanctions lie at the intersection of international trade and geopolitics, where Adam Smith and Niccolo Machiavelli meet. Alas, they frequently prove an unhappy gathering place, serving the interests of neither economics nor politics. As often as not sanctions make average citizens poorer without changing rulers' behavior.

Exhibit A is that epic study in ineffectuality, the 50-year U.S. embargo of Cuba, which has impoverished Cubans without swaying the island's dictator (http://tiny.cc/…). Our motivation was understandable: We weren't willing to bomb Havana but we couldn't stand by and do nothing about a Communist tyranny 90 miles from our shores. Yet benign though our motives might have been, our embargo has done little good.

Our motives for sanctioning Russia are also understandable. We desperately don't want war but we promised Ukraine in 1994 to respect their borders in return for the removal of nuclear weapons.

So did the Russians, who owned the weapons, but now they've seized Crimea, infiltrated rebels into other parts of eastern Ukraine and massed troops on the Ukrainian border. If we do nothing, and betray the Ukrainians, why should NATO allies like Poland and Latvia believe we'll fulfill our treaty obligations to protect them?

As reprehensible as Russia's behavior has been, its motives are understandable, too. Off and on throughout history Russia has owned Ukraine; the Crimean city Sevastopol remained the homeport of Russia's Black Sea fleet even after Ukraine became independent again in 1991. Ukraine's recent tilt toward Western Europe discomfited Russia, just as we'd be discomfited if Canada had a strongly pro-Russian, anti-American government.

Discomfiture doesn't justify aggression, though. Nor does the other Russian motive, which is also understandable though less defensible: Vladimir Putin has staked the legitimacy of his rule on restoring wounded national pride. He aims to establish a Russian bloc with neighboring countries as vassal states, much as they were in the Soviet era.

In the early stages of the Ukrainian crisis, U.S. and European dithering encouraged Putin to think he could get away with it. As the German scholar Ulrich Speck puts it, "In the first half of 2014, the West's internal confusion over how to deal with a more aggressive Russia allowed the Kremlin to perceive the West as divided, confused, and weak (http://tiny.cc/…)."

Now, late in the game, the West has imposed some reasonably tough, though still not loophole-free, sanctions. But Putin has gone too far in Ukraine to back down. He must instead try to convince us to back off.

Thus have tit-for-tat sanctions brought the world to a fateful turning point. Putin no more wants a shooting war with the West than we do. If he toughs out sanctions for months or years, his people will suffer and become restless, undermining his regime's stability. If he retreats he risks humiliation, which would also undermine his regime's stability.

To squirm out of this box, Putin can try to sign up allies -- China is the obvious candidate -- to hunker down with him in a new Cold War with the West. Or he can negotiate a deal that saves his face and gives Russia a say in the world but forces the Russians to treat neighbor states as full sovereign equals.

Anyone interested in world peace and prosperity will vote for the second solution. But to get there will take more skillful diplomacy than anyone on either side has demonstrated.

With so much at stake geopolitically, short-term economic considerations must take second place. This time Machiavelli trumps Smith. American farm groups seem to understand this. Their commendable response to the ban has been measured.

The American Soybean Association, for example, urged Russia to rescind the ban but downplayed its effect. Russia is important, ASA president Ray Gaesser said, but it "is only one of hundreds of our customers worldwide."

Indeed. America's ag exports to Russia represent less than 1% of our ag-export total. If sanctions lead to a new, destabilizing Cold War, American farmers -- all Americans, really -- will have bigger problems than a few lost sales to Russia.

Urban Lehner can be reached at urbanity@hotmail.com

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